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Why, when given the same resources, might  an endogenous variable, affccted by decisions of
productivity be lower on farms operated through  both large landholders arid peasants about (I)
sharecropping than on owner-run farms, even  techniques ard  (2) forms in which to hold their
though sharecropping is an efficient institution  wealth. These decisions and their consequcnces
in economies in which land is unequally distrib-  are affected in tum by changes in technology
uted? The reason is that sharecropping, much  and in the rural infrastructure.
less wage contracts, cannot overcome the
divergence of interests bctween those who till  When credit to farmers is rationed, changes
the land and those who own it.  Only land redis-  in technology can increase the inequality in
tribution can do that.  landholdings -with  a long-term increase in
share tenancy.  This in turn might reduce pro-
Braverman and Stiglitz present notes toward  ductivity, at least partiaBly  offsetting the initial
a general equilibrium theory of land tenancy that  improvements.
suggests how changes in technology and in
publicly provided infrastructure can affect the  Braverman and Stiglitz suggest that the
equilibrium distribution of land in countries  development of effective rural financial institu-
where credit to farmers is rationed.  tions would reduce the likelihood of these
negative effects on equality and productivity.
They argue that the prevalence of share  They caution though that past attempts in
tenancy is directly related to inequality in the  creating such institutions largely failed because
distribution of wealth - and of landholding in  of a lack of accountability and of enforcement
particular.  But inequality should be viewed as  procedures.
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Introduction
In earlier  work,  we argued  that  it  was  mistaken  for  economists  to
treat  institutions  as given:  many institutions  frequently  found  in  market
economies  arise  endogenously  as  a response  to informational  considerations
and  inequality in  the  distribution  of  wealth.  In  particular,  these
considerations  can  explain  the  persistence  and  pervasiveness of
sharecropping  in LDCs (Stiglitz,  1974 and  Braverman  &  Stiglitz,  1986a)  and
credit  rationing  in  capital market3 in  both  developed  and less-developed
countries  (Stiglitz  &  Weiss,  1981).
This  chapter  has three  objectives:  to show  how  sharecropping  and
capital  market  imperfections  affect  rural  productivity;  to sketch  a general
equilibrium  theory  of land  tenancy; and,  finally, to  show  how changes  in
technology and  in  publicly  provided  infrastructure  may  affect the
equilibrium distribution  of  land,  and  hence, the  prevalent tenancy
relationships.  These  relationships  are  important  because  they  influence
the  long-run increase in  national income made  possible by changes  in
technology  and infrastructure.
Recent  literature  has  considered the  effect of  inequality  on
technological  change. Concern  has  been  expressed,  for  instance,  that  the
inequality  within  LDCs  has impeded the  adoption  of  certain  innovations.  1
1,  See,  for  instance,  Bhaduri (1973, 1980), who contends  that  landlords
will  resist  innovations  which  reduce their power  to  exploit  the
workers.- 2 -
In an  earlier  paper (Braverman  &  Stiglitz,  1986b)  we examined  the  validity
of that  contention and  showed that, although the  standard  exploitation
arguments  may  not  be  valid,  there were  indeed innovations  that  might
increase  output,  for  each level  of  input,  that  would  not  be adopted;  these
innovations,  however, exacerbated the  incentive problems  (e.g.,  those
associated  with sharecropping).
This  paper  is  concerned with  the  other  side  of the relationship
between  technological  change  and  inequality:  the  long-run effect  of
technical  change  on inequality,  and  the  effect  of inequality,  in  turn,  on
productivity.  We shall  show  that  an  increase in inequality  may  have  a
deleterious  effect  on  productivity.
The  effect  on output of  changes  in  technology  and infrastructure
may be ambiguous. For  some  changes, long-run  inequality  is reduced,  and
for  these  changes,  the  long-run productivity  gains  are  accordingly  likely
to be greater  than  those  in  the  short run.  On the  other  hand,  for  some
changes, long-run inequality is  increased.  These  innovations,  while
increasing  output  in the  short  run,  may --  in  the  absence  of countervailing
actions  by the  government  --  in  the  long  run  have  a deleterious  effect  on
the  economy.  It  is  important to  recognize this  possibility,  so that
attention  can  be  drawn  to  institutional  reforms designed  to  ameliorate
these  inequality-related  long-run  productivity  effects.
The fact  that  technological  change can  have an adverse  effect  on
inequality  has long been  recognized.  Indeed, it  is  known  that  it is
possible  that  a technological  change would  so  reduce  the  demand  for,  say,
unskilled  labor  that  not only  its share,  but  also  the  absolute  value  of the
real  wage  of unskilled  workers might  fall.  This  might  be the  case,  for
instance,  if  the  innovation  is labor-augmenting  (so  that  one  worker  can  do
what ten workers previously could) and  the  elasticity  of substitution- 3  -
between  unskilled  labor  and  other  factors is  very low  (so  that,  given  the
increase  in the  effective supply of  labor, the  wage  per  efficiency  unit
falls  more  than  proportionately  to the  increase  in the  productivity  of the
workers).
The  mechanism  by  which  technological  change can  have an adverse
effect  on  workers  in  our  analysis is, however, quite  different. It is
based  on two  hypotheses:
*  Many forms  of  technological  change are  capital-using;
that  is,  they  require as complementary  inputs  additional
capital.  (Equivalently,  at  the  original levels of
capital  and  labor  inputs, the  value  of  the  marginal
product  of  capital  is increased.)
*  Capital markets are  imperfect, so  that  poor  farmers
cannot  easily borrow the  additional required  capital.
Even  if they  could, of  course,  the  technological  change
could  have  an  adverse effect on  the  distribution  of
wealth  (income);  for  it will increase  the  scarcity  value
of capital,  and  thus  the  return to  capital. But  our
concern  is  not  with this static  or short-run  effect,  but
rather  with  a long-run effect that is  a consequence  of
credit  rationing.
The  lack  of access to  capital means  that,  after  a technological
change,  land  will  be more  valuable to  someone who  has the  capital  to  use
with it than  to someone  who does not.  This,  in  turn  will induce  some  of
the  poorer  farmers  to sell  their  land to  richer  landlords. In the  short
run,  this  simply  represents  a  change in  the form  in  which  wealth  is  held.
But  because  the  wealth  distribution  in  one  period  depends  not  only  on the
distribution  of  wealth  in  the  previous period, but  also  on the  form  inwhich  different  wealth  groups  hold their  wealth,  this  sale  of land  may  have
adverse  long-run  effects  on the  wealth  distribution.
Finally,  an adverse  effect on  wealth  distribution  has an adverse
effect  on  productiviLf.  The  reason for  this  is  that  as inequality
increases,  it  is  more  likely that  sharecropping  arrangements  will  be
employed; 2  and,  although sharecropping  arrangements  may  be Pareto
efficient  (that  is,  given  the  constraints on  monitoring  the  worker  and  the
risk  aversion  of  workers, there  may  not  be  an alternative  contractual
arrangement  between  workers and  landlords that makes  both  better  off),
still,  output  may  be significantly  lower with sharecropping  than  it  would
be  with owner-operated  farms.  3
Our  contention  then that  certain changes  in technology  (certain
governmental  projects, such as  irrigation  projects) may  have long-run
adverse  effects  on the  economy which  partly  offset  the  short-run  effects,
requires  a  number  of steps  to  establish, each  of  which  is  of some  interest
in its  own  right.  In  the  subsequent sections,  we provide  simple  models
establishing  conditions  under  which  each  of  the  contentions  we have  put
forward  is  valid.
2/  There  are,  of  course,  other  reasons  why  wealth  inequality  may give  rise
to a reduction  in  productivity.  Dasgupta & Ray (1986)  for  instance,
discuss  the  consequences  of inequality  in  the  context  of an economy  in
which  productivity  depends  on nutrition.
3/  Although  sharecropping  contracts  are  pairwise efficient,  in the sense
that  they  maximize  the  welfare  of  the  worker  given  the  expected  rents
of the  landlord,  they  may  not  be globally  efficient;  that is,  there  may
exist  governmental  interventions (say taxes or subsidies)  which  make
all  individuals  better  off.  This is  a  general  result  in the  theory  of
imperfect  information  and incomplete  markets;  see  Greenwald  & Stiglitz
(1986).PRODUCTIVITY  AND  SHARECROPPING
The  standard  formulation  of  the  sharecropping  contractual
arrangement  (where  the  contract  ts chosen  to  maximize  the  expected  utility
of the  worker,  subject  to a  constraint on the  expected  return  per  acre  of
the  landlord)  makes  it clear  that  such contracts  are (at  least  pairwise)
efficient. But  that  does  not  mean that  national  income  might  not  be higher
__ significantly  higher --  in the absence of sharecropping.
Here  we ask  the  question:  What would  happen  if  the  land  that  a
sharecropper  currently  works  were redistributed  to  the  worker,  so  that  he
now received  the  rents?  The  classical  argument  against  sharecropping  was
that,  because  the  worker  received only  a fraction  of  his  marginal  return,
he would  work less  than  he  would  if  he received  his  marginal  product  and
accordingly,  such  contracts  were inefficient. We have already  argued  that
sharecropping  contracts  are  pairwise  efficient. The former  contention  that
individuals  would  work less,  is  not  obvious either  since  as  we transfer
resources  to the  worker,  he  becomes better off,  and  because  he is  better
off,  he may  work less  hard.
The  question  of  whether  output would  be  higher  or lower  under  a
land  reform  is  thus  close  to  the  question  of  whether  an increase  in  wages
increases  or decreases  the  labor  supply (measured in  terms  of  hours  or
effort).  While  an  increase in  the wage  has  a  positive incentive
(substitution)  effect,  it  has a  negative income  effect,  and  the  net  effect
is  ambiguous. The  question  is  similar, but  not the  same  as,  the  question
of  whether  the standard  labor  supply  curve  is  backward-bending,  because  the
marginal  return  to labor  in  the  circumstances  under  examination  here is  a
stochastic  variable  (Braverman  & Srinivasan, 1981).  We can show  that  so
long  as  workers  are  not too  risk  averse  (that  is,  so long  as there  is  not  a-6-
too  strongly dlmlnishLng  marginal utility of  income),  the  substitution
effect  will  outweigh  the  income effect, and  a land  reform  will increase
output.
To  see  this,  we  postulate that workers are  risk  averse  wlth a
utility  function  of the  form  4
U(Y,L)  - u(Y)  - v(L)  (1)
where
u'  >  O,  ul  <  O,  vI  >  O,  VI  >  O
and  where  Y  is income  and  L  is the  worker's  labor  supply  measured  In
terms  of effort. We assume  that  the  agricultural  production  function  takes
on the  simple  form  of
Q  - ag(O)f(LIa)  (2)
where  f  is  output  per  acre,  0  is  a random  variable,  and  a  is  the
representative  worker's  plot size.  For  simplicity,  we shall  normalize a
at  unity.
Wj assume  a simple sharecropping  system where  the  tenant  worker
gets  a fraction a  of the  return. For simplicity,  we assiune  that  this  is
his  entire  income,  so that
Y  - 8gf.  (3)
4/  Implicitly,  in this  formulation  we  are  assuming  that  the  individual's
utility  depends  on  his  current income; i.e., there  are  not capital
markets  in  which  he can  borrow or  lend. This  is  obviously  an extreme
assumption,  but it is far  better  than  the  opposite  extreme,  in  which  it
is  postulated  that  workers  can  borrow and  lend  at a fixed  (low)  real
market  rate  of interest.  Thus,  the  assumption  of capital  constraints
appears  as an implicit assumption even  in  the  traditional  models  of
sharecropping.  This analysis could  be  extended to  the  case  where
borrowing  and lending  are  feasible, in  which  case  U  becomes  the
lifetime  utility  function,  and  Y  is interpreted  as lifetime  wealth.Then  the  first  order  condition  for  the  level  of effort  is  S
Eu'lgf'  - v'.  (4)
We can  depict  the  consequences  of a  land  reform  as turning  over  control  of
the  land  to the  worker,  that  is,  as  an  increase in  a  to  1.  Thus,
differentiating  (4),  we immediately  obtain
sign  dL/da  - sign  Egf'u'(1-R)  (5)
where  R  - -u*YIu',  the  elasticity of the  marginal  utility  of income  or
the  Arrow-Pratt  measure  of relative  risk  aversion. Thus,  provided
R <  1,  (6)
that  is,  provided  workers are  not  too  risk averse, a land  reform  will
increase  effort, and  hence will  increase mean  national output. (The
analogous condition for  the  deterministic  case  is  in  Braverman &
Srinivasan,  1981.)
The  magnitude  of the  response may  be  quite  large: crop  shares
typically  are  in  the  order  of  magnitude of 50  percent;  thus,  a land  reform
has  the  same  effect  as  the  elimination  of  a 50  percent  income  tax.
Land  Reform  & Land  Taxes
This  analysis  provides  some  suggestions  concerning  the
longstanding  issue  of the  desirability  of  land  taxes,  as opposed  to  output
taxes. Land  taxes  provide  fixed  payments  to the  government,  just  as rental
payments provide fixed payments to  the  landlord.  Output taxes  are
equivalent  to  sharecropping  agreements;  the  government  shares  in  production
5/  This  formulation  assumes that  effort is  exerted before  the  random
variable 9  is  known.risks  (as  well  as  price  risks).  Land  taxes  have  preferable  incentive
properties,  just  as rental payments do.  But,  just  as  earlier  analyses
(e.g.,  Stiglitz,  1974)  argued that  sharecropping  contracts  were  preferable
to fixed  rents when  tenants are  risk averse, so  too  are  output  taxes
preferable  to land  taxes  when landlords are risk  averse. Indeed,  the  case
for  the  desirable  risk-sharing  properties of output  taxes  is  even greater,
for  the  government  is  able  to diversify  the risks  that  it faces  better  than
the  typical  landlord  can.  6  To put  it another  way,  the  assumption  e in
the  literature that  landlords are  risk  neutral is  a  much  closer
approximation  to describing  the  government than  it  is to describing  the
representative  landlord,  particularly  in  Asia  and  Africa. And  by switching
from  output  taxes to  land taxes, the  feasible set  of,  say,  mean and
standard  deviation  of income  of landlords  and  workers  is  made  worse.
Moreover, in  tCe  more  general case of  linear sharecropping
contracts,  with
y  - agf  4p
6/  This  discussion has,  of  course, ignored what  may  be  the  central
criticism  against  land  taxes, the  administrative  problems  associated
with levying  such  taxes  in an  equitable  manner,  and  the  abuse  to  which
such  taxes  are  subject. Moreover, in  practice,  such  taxes  are  usually
based  not  on the  intrinsic value  of  the  land,  but  on the *improved,
value  of land.  Thus,  they  a-  in  effect, a  tax  on (the  present
discounted  value  of)  land  rents plus  a  tax  on capital. Because  they
are  a tax  on the  present  discounted value  of land  rents,  they serve  to
increase  the  risk borne by  land,'-rds,  since the  present  discounted
value  of land  rents  is likely  to  be much less  variable  than  the  annual
value  of land  rents  (and besides, tax  authorities  usually  revise  the
appraised  value  of land only  periodically). Moreover,  the  fact  that
capital is  taxed, while  labor  is  not,  introduces  an  important
distortion.  As is  usually  the  case  in the  theory  of the  second-best,
it is  not  obvious  whether  a  uniform  distortion  (taxing  labor,  land,  and
capital)  is  better  or  worse  than  a selective  distortion  (taxing  land
and  capital). This  is  a  question we  hope to  investigate  on another
occasion.- 9  -
the  shift  from  an  output tax  to  an  equal-expected-revenue  land  tax  may
result  in  a rise in  2, the  crop  share,  and  an offsetting  change  in  p,  the
fixed  rent  or  wage,  as the  landlord shifts some  of  his increased  risk  to
the  worker. Note  that welfare may  be reduced,  even  though  average  rural
income  may  be increased (as a  result of  the  greater  effort  exerted  by
workers  because  of the  greater share provided  by the  equilibrium  contract
under  the  land  tax).  In  the case where  the  landlord  is risk  averse,
expected  utility  of  workers  and/or  landlords will  be reduced. Only  in  the
case  where  the landlord  is risk  neutral will the  switch  from  an  output  tax
to an equal-expected-revenue  land tax  leave  the  equilibrium  unchanged.  7
7/  This follows  from  the  fact that  total  expected  payments  to landlords
and  the  government  are  fixed,  and  hence  the  solution  to the  problem  of
maximizing  the  worker's  expected  utility subject  to that  constraint  is
unaffected.- 10  -
A MODEL  OF LAND  VALUATION
To ascertain  the  effect  of technical  change  on the  distribution  of
land,  we first  need  to construct  a  model  of land  valuation.
We will find  it  useful  to distinguish  between  the  value  of land  to
a landlord  who lets  out  his  land, and  the  value  of land  to  a farmer  who
works  his  own iand. Moreover,  we  will  need to  extend  the  production  model
described  in the  previous  section to  incorporate  the  effects  of technical
change  and  capital  availability.  We thus  postulate  that the  average  output
per  acre  of a plot  of land is  represented  by a  production  function  of the
form
q - E(k,X,t)  (7)
where  k  is  capital per  acre,  X  is the  amount  of effort  which  each
sharecropper  supplies  per  acre  of the  sharecropping  land (hence, x  - L/a),
t  is the  state  of  technology,  and  Eg(O)  - 1  (and  so is suppressed).
Changes  in  t  can  be  thought of  as reflecting  not  only technological
changes,  but  also changes in  the  level  of  certain publicly  provided
services,  such  as irrigation  and  extension  services.
Under  a sharecropping  contract  with a fixed  share  e,  the  present
discounted  value  of  the  returns to  the  landlord of  an acre  worked  at
intensity I  with capital k  is just  8
8/  For simplicity,  we assume that  the  rate  of interest  is  corstant  (or
that  the  market values assets as  if  the  rate  of  interest  were
constant). (This  might  be true,  for  instance,  if the  rate  of interest
was described  by a random walk,  so  that  the  expected  value  of future
rates  of interest  was  equal  to  the  current value  of  the  rate  of
interest.)  We also assume, somewhat less  plausibly,  that  the  market
ignores  all  future  possibilities  of technological  change  (or  changes  in
government-provided  facilities  which  affect productivity).  This  may
not  be a bad  approximation  if such  changes  occur  only sporadically,  and
real  interest  rates  used  for  discounting  are  relatively  high.- 11  -
v  . (1-a)  I  (k,  X,  t)Ir  CJ)
where  k  and  X  are  both  endogenously  determined,  and  r  is the  rate  of
interest  at  whic),  future  income  flows  are  discounted.  9  In principle,  we
should  also  make  a  an endogenous  variable, 10  but in practice a  seems
to  vary little,  even  over  quite  extended  periods,  and  even in the  presence
of some  significant  changes  in  technology.  Here  we take  a  and  the  number
of  workers  on each  plot  of land as fixed,  leaving  for  a later  occasion  the
extension  to the  more general  case  where  both  are  endogenous.
From the  first-order  condition  for  effort  (equation  (4)  above),  we
can  immediately  derive  the  equilibrium  level of  effort of a  worker  as  a
function  of the  amount  of  capital per  acre  provided  by the landlord,  the
state  of technology,  and  the  size of  the  plot  of land that  the  worker
works:  11
9/  Clearly,  if there  were a perfect  capital market, r  would  be the  rate
of interest  at  which landlords  could borrow  and  lend.  In  an imperfect
capital  market,  it is  a  more  subtle matter  to determine r. Although
in  principle r  itself may  be  affected  by changes  in technology,  for
the  purposes  of this  analysis,  we treat  r  as fixed.
10/  And  indeed, we  should  introduce  more  complicated sharecropping
contracts,  e.g.,  with a fixed  (rental or  wage)  component,  or  with  cost
sharing.  Each  of  these  terms  should, in  principle, also be
endogenously  determined,  and  thus vary with  t.  Introducing  these
extensions  would, we  suspect, considerably  complicate the  analysis
without  changing  the  basic  qualitative  results.
11/  For the  moment,  we assume  that the  worker  engaged  in sharecropping  can
work  only  on  the  sharecropping  land.  If  the  sharecropper  has
alternative  opportunities,  e.g.,  if  he  can  work as a  wage laborer,  or
if  he owns  or rents  a plot  of land,  then  this  will obviously  affect  the
amount  of labor that  he  supplies on  the  sharecropping  land. The
landlord, in  such  situations, would  attempt  to  restrict the
sharecropper's  access  to these  opportunities.- 12 -
- *  +(k,a,t)  (9)
where,  as  before,  a  is  the  number of  acres per  worker  engaged  in
sharecropping. (In  the  previous  section, it will  be recalled,  we took a
to be unity.)  k  is then  chosen  to  maximize
(1-a)  f  {k,)  (k,a,t)  t)  - rk;  (10)
that  is,
(1-a)  Ilk  +  !k  (d)\Idk))  - r.  (11)
Note  that  in  this  formulation  all  the  capital costs are  borne  by the
landlord;  this follows  naturally from  the  assumption,  which  will play  a
central  role in  the  subsequent analysis, that  landlords  have  access  to
capital  but  workers  do  not. 12
Equation  (11)  has some interesting implications:  while  the  fact
that  the  landlord  can  appropriate  only a fraction  of the  marginal  returns
from  his application  of additional  capital  discourages  the  use  of capital,
the  fact  that  additional  capital  may  elicit greater  effort  on the  part  of
workers  may encourage  the  use  of  capital.  d.ldk will be positive  if
capital  and labor  are  complements,  that  is,  if an increase  in the  supply  of
12/  At the  same  time,  Braverman  & Stiglitz  (1986a)  show  that  in the  absence
of an asymmetry  of information  concerning  0, it  makes  no difference
whether  the contract  specifies  that  the  landlord  or the  tenant  supply
capital,  so long  as the  capital  input  is observable.-13  -
capital  increases  the  marginal  return  to labor  13
by  enough  to  offset  the  reduction in  effort supply  resulting  from  the
higher  income  provided  by the increased  input  of  capital.
We nov derive  the  effect  of a  change  in technology  on the  value  of
sharecropping  land. Assuming  that  the  landlords  optimally  adjust  the  level
of  k,  we obtain  (here,  as  in  the  remainder  of this  section,  we drop  the
bar  over  f)
dVS/dt  - (1-a)  (ft  +  fX (dXldt)}Ir.  (12) t 
131  From  the  first-order  condition  for X  (taking a  as given),  we obtain
sign  dXldk  - sign  E u'g (Ifk  - R f  kfAf)
The  income  effect  (the increased capital increases  income  at a fixed
effort level) discourages  effort;  but  the  substitution  effect
encourages  it.  provided f  >  0.  The  substitution  effect  will exceed
the  income  effect,  provided  only  that  R  <  ffkI/fkf)  - lia,  that  is,
provided  that  the  product of  the  elasticity  of marginal  utility  (the
Arrow-Pratt  measure  of relative risk aversion) and  the  elasticity  of
substitution  is less  than  unity.
Note  that,  if there  were  a  fixed  fee  element  to the  sharecropping
contract,  which  the  landlord could adjust to  offset  the  increased
income  resulting  from  the  increased capital (making,  in effect,  the
tenant  pay for  the  capital)  or  if  the  landlord  could  adjust  the  share
downward,  to compensate  for  the  increased  capital,  then  there  would  not
be an income  effect. The  presumption  then  that  an increase  in  capital
will result in  greater effort will be  stronger; see  Braverman  &
Stiglitz  (1986a).- 14-
In  words,  the  change  in  technology  has  a direct  effect  (at  fixed  levels  of
inputs  of effort  and  capital)  and  an indirect  effect,  through  the  effect  on
the supply  of  effort.  If  the  technological  improvement  increases  the
marginal  productivity  of effort,  as in  Figure  9.1A,  then  again  there  is  a
presumption  that  the  supply  of effort  will be increased.  14
But  if  the  technological  improvement  reduces the  marginal
productivity  of effort  in the  relevant  range  (\(t)  >)3,  i.e.,  at the  old
equilibrium  level  of inputs  in  Figure  9.1B),  then  the  supply  of effort  will
fall.  Indeed, if  the  technological  improvement  reduces the  marginal
productivity  at the  old  level  of output  by enough,  then  the  indirect  effect
of  reduced effort will  outweigh the  direct productivity  effect,  and
equilibrium  output  will be lower.
14/  Again,  there  is  an  income effect and  a  substitution  effect. As in
n.13,  we can  show  that
sign  dXjdt  - sign  E  u'g (f  t  - R fXft/f).
There  is,  of course,  no  presumption  that  a technological  change  will,
at a fixed  level of  labor and  capital  inputs,  increase  the  marginal
productivity  of labor. Figure 9.1  illustrates  two  possibilities.  For
a  more extended  discussion of  these  issues,  see  Braverman  & Stiglitz
(1986b).- 15  -
FIGUR  O.  1^
At  *11  l*vOel  of  input.  techn;es  change  increases  th  marginsl  Peoductivity  of labor.
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At  all  levels  of  input  above A. technical  change reduces  the  marginal  productivity  of  labor.- 16  _
The  indirect  effect  of a  small  change  in technology  on the  input
of capital  can  be  ignored, by  the  envelope theorem.  But  the  indirect
effect  on  k  of a large  change  in technology  cannot  be ignored:  15
Ava - na  [f{k(t'),(t..t't-f(k(t).(t).t})  - (k(t')-k(t)) (13)
where  t  is the  original technology,  t'  the  new  technology,  and  k(t)
(k(t')) represents  the  capital input with the  original  (new  technology),
and  where  \(t)  - #fk(t),  a(t),t)  and  X(t')  - #{k(t'),  a(t'),  t')  are
-Uimilarly  defined.
We now turn  to tie  effect  of the  technological  change  on the  value
of owner-worked  land, We first  express this  value  in terms  of the  present
discounted  value  of utility generated by  the  land,  under  the  hypothesis
that  the  worker-owner  does  not  have  access to  capital. Then  the  value  of
an a-acre  farm  is
V0 - max  - E [u{evf(O,A,t)}  - v(X)J  (14)
from  which  it follows  that
dV°Idt  - (aEu'gf  t)Ir  (15)
15/  This  analysis  assumes that  sharecropping  land  is  purchased  with its
workers,  i.e.,  that  one  cannot change the  number  of  workers  per acre.
More generally,  of course, the  value  of  land  is  a function  of the
number  of workers  per  acre, which  itself is  an endogenous  variable.
Obviously,  if the  landlord  does  not  need  to  change  the  terms  of the
contract  to offset a  decrease in  the  acreage per  worker,  he would
increase  the  number  of workers per  acre without bound,  or at least
until  certain  efficiency  wage effects  became  significant.- 17 -
Again,  because  of the  envelope  theorem,  we can  ignore  the  induced  change  in
the  supply  of effort;  but  for  large changes  in technology,  we cannot,  and
we obtain
AVO-  I  rEu[af{O,X(t'),t')g]  - Eu[af(O,X(t),t)gl  (16) r1  - uafO)t)  g)  - (16)
Comparing (16)  and  (13),  it  is  apparent  that a technological
change  can  have  quite  different effects on  land  that is sharecropped  and
land  that  is  worked  by its  owners.  In the  limiting  case,  where  capital  is
required  to take  advantage  of  the  new  technology,  there  is  no change  in
VO.  More  generally, the  technological improvement  will  have a larger
effect  on sharecropped  land  relative  to owner-worked  land:
a.  the  more  the  improvement depends on  the  level  of capital
(Figure  9.2);
b.  the  less  the  improvement  depends  on the  level  of labor  effort
(Figure  9.3);  that  is,  the  new technology  does  not increase
output  at  very  labor-intensive  technologies  as  much as at
less  labor-intensive  technologies;  16  and
C.  the  greater  the  effect  of  the  technological  change  on the
marginal  productivity  of effort  (at least,  at the levels  of
labor  and  capital  employed  in sharecropping).
16/  Recall  from  the  earlier discussion of  sharecropping  that  labor  input
will be lower  with sharecropping,  provided the  income  effects  are  not
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A  Slight  Generalization
The  model  presented above  assumed that  poor  farmers  who  worked
their  own land  had  no access  to capital. A better  assumption  might  be that
they  can  obtain  capital  only  by  selling their  land. Assume  that  with the
initial  technology  the  owner-farmer uses  no  capital, and  that in  fact
capital  is  not  productive.  The  technological  change  alters  this. Assume
that  he can sell  his land  to a  rich  landowner for  a price  Vs  per  acre,
and  assume  that  his  initial  endowment  of  land  is  a*.  I..  he retains  any
land  to farm  himself,  assume  that  it  will  be  optimal  for  him to use  the
proceeds  of the sale  to  buy capital  equipment. Then  he  will choose a, the
number  of acres  he retains,  to  maximize  his expected  utility:
max EulgaffVs(a*-a)  ),t)J - v(X)  (17)
(k.a)
that  is,
Eu'g (f -afV)  0  (if  a < a*)  (18) k
or
f  - af  V  (19)
or
(a*  - a)/a  - f  kkIf  - b(k,))  - the 'share'  of  capital  in output.
(20)
We can  again consider the  effects of  technical change  on the
welfare  of the  owner-worker.  Since, by  assumption,  with the  original
technology  the  owner employs no  capital, by  the  envelope  theorem,  the- 20 -
effect  of a small  technological  improvement  is  again  described  by equxation
(15). But  the  effect  of a larger  technological  improvenient  is  now  given  by
bV°  - 1 (Eu[g a(tl)f[VS(a - a(t')),  )(t'),  t')J-
i  (RU  (21)
Eu[ga*f  (0,  \(t),  t) - vQX(t'))  +  v(X(t))])
where it  should  be noted  that the  labor  supply  is  now  different  from  what
it  was  earlier,  because  of the  change  in k  and  a.- 21 -
TECHNICAL  CUANGE  AND THE  REDISTRIbUtION OF LAND
In the  preceding  section,  we showed  that  a change  in technology  or
infrastructure  could  have  a  markedly different effect on  the  value  of
sharecropped  land  (the  welfare  of landlords) and  on the  welfare  of farmers
working  their  own land. We  now  consider  the  effect  of technical  change  on
the  distribution  of land,  and  the  effects  that  this in  turn  has  on output.
Figure  9.4  shows the  equilibrium in  tne  land  market  under  the
assumption  that  the  owner-workers  can  sell  land  to  obtain  capital. The
curve  SS  is derived  from  equation  (19). It shows  the  amount  of land  that
the  owner-workers  are  willing  to  sell as  a function  of the  market  price,
V8.  In the  figure,  we have  depicted  the  case  where  as  V8 increases,  they
sell  more,  although  this is  not  necessarily the  case. 17 The  curve DD
represents  the  demand  for  sharecropping  land. If  we assume  that  the  number
of available sharecroppers  is  fixed, then  an  increase in  land  under
sharecropping  tenancy  will tend  to  decrease the  value  of each  acre; V8
will  normally  fall.  (Even  if  the substitutior  effect  leads  each  worker  to
work  harder,  the  effective  labor  supply per  -re  will fall.) Thus,  the
demand  curve  in Figure  9.4  is  downward  sloping.
17/  We need to  differentiate  the  first-order  conditions  with respect  to
V8. From  equation  (20) it  is  clear  that if  we have a  Cobb-Douglas
production  function, a  is independent  of  Vs.- 22 -
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Now  consider  the  effect  of  a technical  change  which  increases  the
return  to capital. This  shifts  the  supply  curve  to the  right,  and  may  well
shift  the  demand  curve  up.  Thus,  as  depicted  in  Figure  9.4,  land  will  be
transferred  from  owner-operators  to landlords as a result  of the  technical
change: the  technical  change  has resulted  in an increase  in the  inequality
of land-ownership.
In this  static model, the  change in  the  distribution  of land
owniership  is  welfare  (and productivity)  enhancing:  it  enables  the  poor
farmers,  who otherwise  would  not  have  access  to  capital,  to  take  advantage
of the  new  capital-using  technology.  But  the  productivity  effects  are  more
ambiguous  in  a dynamic  context.- 23 -
A DYNAMIC  MODEL
In spite  of  the  enhanced productivity that might  result  from
selling  their  land  and  using the  proceeds to  purchase capital,  poor
landowners  may be reluctant  to  do so.  They  may feel  that  they  are  holding
the  land,  which  they  inherited from  their parents, in trust  for  their
children. In any  case,  decisions  to sell  land  may  not  be based  solely  on  a
rational  calculation.
Land sales  may  occur  in  the  event  of certain  stringencies,  such  as
a  crop  failure  or the  need for  funds for  an emergency.  Even if it  is only
under  these  circumstances  that  land sales might  occur,  this  does  not  mean
that  economic  factors  do  not  affect the  decision. How serious  the  crisis
must  be before  land  is sold may  depend on how  much  could  be obtained  for
the  land,  particularly relative to what  is  being obtained from  it  at
present,  and  what one  would  obtain  if  one  became  a sharecropper.
In this  section,  we develop  a  simple,  stylized  model  to bring  out
the  central  issues. We assume  that  land  sales  do  not  occur  simply  on the
basis  of the  kinds  of  considerations  presented in the  previous  section.
Changes  in technology or  infrastructure  do  not  cause  any  instantaneous
reorganization  of  land tenure arrangements.  These occur  only slowly.
Individuals  sell  their  land  only  in  crises. For  simplicity,  we assume  that
all  farms  are  of a fixed size; and  that  a  farm  is  either  tilled  by its
owner  or under  a  sharecropping  contract.  The  question then is,  what
fraction  of aggregate  land  is  tilled  under  sharecropping  contracts?
We postulate  that  the probability that  a  farm  which  is  owner-
tilled  will be sold,  and  thus  become  sharecropped,  is
F  - F(V 8, VO,  t)- 24 -
The frequency  of an owner-farmer  selling  his land depends  on  Vs  and V°,
as  well  as on the  technology  itself,  which  may  determine,  for instance,  the
likelihood  of a  crop  failure.  What  is  perhaps more crucial  than  the
absolute  level  either  of  the  expected  returns  while  owner-tilled  (reflected
in  VO),  or the  price  one  can  obtain  for  selling  one's  land (reflected  in
VS) is  the  ratio  of  the  two, and  for  subsequent  discussion,  we postulate
that F  takes  on the  simpler  form
F  - F(V01VS,  t).
The  changes  in  technology or  infrastructure  with  which  we are
concerned  here  decrease  V01Vs,  the  value  of  owner-tilled  land  with
binding  capital  constraints  (the  farmers who  must  sell their  land  in  the
event  of  a crisis)  relative to  sharecropped  land. This  effect  by itself
increases F.
The  direct  effect on  F  of technological  or infrastructure
changes  is ambiguous. It is  often  argued  that  the  Green  Revolution,  while
increasing  mean returns,  has  increased the  variance of the  returns;  the
seeds  are  more sensitive  to  lack  of rainfall,  and thus  the probability  of a
crisis  is  increased. If that  is the  case,  then Ft >  0;  the  direct  effect
of the  technological  change  is to  increase  the  probability  of a land  sale.
There  are,  of  course, other  changes in  technology which  reduce  the
likelihood  of  a  crisis.  Irrigation projects, by  making  farmers  less
sensitive  to the  vagaries  of  weather, are  likely to do this.  It is  even
possible  that  this  direct effect outweighs the  indirect  'market  value"
effect,  so  that  the  overall  probability  of an owner-tiller  selling  his  land
is  decreased.
To derive  an equilibrium  distribution  of land  ownership,  we  have
to have  a theory  of  how  some  land  becomes  converted  back to owner-worked
land;  otherwise,  the  model  would  predict that  eventually  all land  would  be_ 25 -
owned  by large  landowners.  Any  model  in  which  there  are some  stochastic
events  that  impinge  on  landowners,  eventually  converting  a small  fraction
of tenancy  land  into  owner-tilled land, will  do.  Since  this is  not  the
focus  of our  concern  here,  we  simply  postulate  that  there  is  a probability
t(t)  of an  acre  of  sharecropped land  being  converted  into  owner-worked
land.  18 The  equilibrium  pattern of land-ownership  with  a  given  technology
is thus  described  by
Sr  - (1  - S)F
or
S - F/(F  +  'r)
where  S  is  the  share  of land that  is  sharecropped.  Thus,  if a change  in
technology  increases Fir,  it will  increase  the  proportion  of land  under
sharecropping.
It is thus apparent that a  technological  change  (or  change  in
infrastructure)  that  induced more  owner-farmers  to  sell  their  land
(increased  P) could,  in  the  long  run, lead  to  more inequality  in land
ownership  and  an increased  proportion  of land  under  sharecropping.  This  is
true  even  though  the  productivity on  both  owner-run  farms  and  sharecropped
farms  has increased,  so long  as  the  productivity  on sharecropped  farms  has
18/  Clearly,  we could  make  r  depend on  the  value  of land  under  the
alternative  institutional  arrangements. Moreover, the  changes  in  the
probability  distribution  of  returns which  affect the  likelihood  of
owner-tilled  land  being  converted  to  tenancy  are  also  likely  to  affect
the  likelihood  of tenancy land being  converted  to owner-tilled.  For
instance,  if the  variance  of  returns  is large,  then  some  sharecroppers
will  have  large  returns,  enabling  them  to become  owner-tillers.  As  we
show  below,  what is  crucial is  the  effect  of technology  on the  ratio
Fir.- 26 -
increased  relatively,  say  because  of  the increased  productivity  of capital.  19
This  change  in the  distribution  of tenancy  may  have  a deleterious  effect  on
national  productivity.  20
By  the  same  token,  a  technological change  or  change in
infrastructure  which  reduces  F/r,  that is,  which induces  fewer  owner-
farmers  to sell  their  land,  or  which  enables  more sharecroppers  to acquire
the  capital  to  make it  possible (desirable)  for  them  to be owner-tillers,
has  a long-run productivity effect which may  be  far  in  excess  of the
immediate,  short-run  impact.
Similar  results  can  be  obtained in  a  more  general  model. The
wealth  distribution  at time  v+1  depends on the  wealth  distribution  at
time v  and  the  nature  of  the  stochastic  technology.  Let  Oi(v) be the
fraction  of the  population  with  wealth  i  at  time  v.  Let  Mij  be the
transition  matrix,  a  function of  t  (both directly,  and  indirectly,
through  the  choices,  say,  of  effort that  it  induces). Then  in a steady
state,  in  the  obvious  notation,
0*  M(t)  - 0*-
Changes  in technology  will  change the  distribution  of outcomes  under  any
given  pattern  of tenancy, and  will  thereby change the  fraction  of  land
under  tenancy  (Figure  9.5).  Hence, changes  in  technology  will affect  the
19/  Assuming  that  credit  is  rationed, and  that  credit  constraints  are  more
binding  upon  poor farmers  than  upon  wealthier  farmers.
201  The  change  in  tenancy  arrangements  will  have  a  more  deleterious  effect
on  productivity,  the  greater  the  difference  in  productivity  on tenancy
farms  and  on owner-run  farms; this difference is likely  to  be larger
the  greater  the  elasticity  of the  supply  of effort,  and  the  smaller  the
extent  to  which  an increase in  capital  increases  the  marginal  product
of  effort.- 27  -
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steady-state  wealth distribution,  and  this  in  turn will  have  real
productivity  effects. Virtually  all  changes  in technology  which  change  the
transition  matrix M  will  lead  to  a  changed  long-run  distribution  of
wealth,  landholdings,  and  tenancy  arrangements.
Three  tasks  now lie  before  us.  First,  we need  to  be able  to show
how  particular  changes in  technology lead  to  particular  changes  in  the
transition  matrix H(t).  We need to  ascertain  the  precise  conditions  under
which  changes  in technology  are  likely  to change  significantly  the long-run
equilibrium  distributions,  both  positively and  negatively.  Our  discussion
has suggested  that  adverse distribution  effects are  more likely  to arise
from  changes  in technology  which  increase the  variance  of  output  (or  more
precisely,  the  likelihood  of  a  serious  crop  failure,  sufficiently  serious
that the  farmer  has to  sell his  land); and  which increase  the  return  to
capital.
Secondly,  if there  is  an  adverse distribution  effect,  we need  to
know  the  magnitude  of the  effect  on  productivity.
Thirdly,  the  fact  that  the  distrib'ition  of landholdings  (tenancy
arrangements)  may  have  a  significant  impact  on  productivity  suggests  that- 28 -
institutional  and  other  reforms which  increase equality may  have  an
important  side  effect  of increasing output.  Economists  have long  focused
on the  tradeoff between inequality and  output.  This  analysis  suggests
either  that  there  may  not be a tradeoff  in  the  long  run,  or  that  the  amount
of output  that  need  be  sacrificed for  an  improvement  in  equality  may  be
less  than  previously  thought.
Our  analysis  suggests  particular institutional  reforms  that  might
either  ameliorate  any  negative distribution  effects or  accentuate  any
positive  distribution  effects.  We  have  emphasized the  role  of capital
constraints.  Credit  rationing,  we  have  argued, is  the  natural  result  of
informational  imperfections.  Informational  problems  are  no less  important
for  the  government  than  for  private  lenders.  This  is  not  a  market  failure
for  which  there  is  an  obvious public remedy.  On  the  other  hand,  our
analysis  points  to  the  potential role of credit  cooperatives  in promoting
rural  development.  Examples  of successful  cooperatives  are  found  in  Korea,
Taiwan,  and  Kenya.  Unfortunately,  credit cooperatives  in  many  other
countries  have  failed. The  reasons for  the  predominance  of failures  over
successes, and  an  analysis of  the  enforcement  mechanisms in  credit
cooperatives,  are  found  in  Braverman  and  Guasch  (1989).- 29 -
CONCLUSION
We  have  argued here  that  even  if  share tenancy is  Pareto-
efficient,  productivity  with share  tenancy may  be lower  than  with owner-
operated  farms. The  prevalence  of share  tenancy  is  directly  related  to the
inequality  in  the  distribution  of wealth,  and  of landholding  in  particular.
But the  degree of  inequality should itself be  viewed  as an  endogenous
variable, affected by  decisions by  both  large landholders  and  small
peasants  concerning  the  choice  of technique and  the  forms  in  which  to  hold
their  wealth.  Both  these decisions and their  consequences,  in turn,  are
affected  by changes  in  technology  and  in the  rural  infrastructure.  In the
presence  of  credit  rationing,  changes  in technology  may  increase  inequality
in landholdings,  with  a  long-run increase in  the prevalence  of share
tenancy.  This  in  turn  may  have  long-run deleterious  effects on
productivity  at least  partially offsetting the  initial  improvements.  We
have  suggested that  the  development  of  effective rural financial
institutions  would  reduce the  likelihood of  these negative  effects  on
equality  and  productivity.
Here,  we have  only  sketched  the  outlines  of a general  theory. We
have,  however,  provided  a  framework which  should  enable  one  to determine
whether,  in  any  particular case, changes in technology  or infrastructure
have the  possible  adverse  effects  we have  noted.- 30 -
REFERENCES
Bhaduri, A  (1973),  "Agricultural Backwardness  under  Semifeudalism',
Economic  Journal,  83:120-137.
(1980),  'Agricultural  Backwardness  Under  Semifeudalism:  A
Rejoinder",  Economic  Journal,  89:420-421.
Braverman,  A  and  L.  Guasch  (1989), "Institutional  Analysis of Credit
Cooperatives",  in P. Bardhan,  ed.,  The  Economic  Theory  of  Agrarian
Institutions.  Oxford  University  Press.
Braverman,  A and  L.  Guasch  (1986), 'Rural  Credit  Markets  and  Institutions
in  Developing Countries:  Lessons for  Policy Analysis from
Practice  and  Modern  Theory", World  Development,  14:1253-1267.
Braverman,  A  and  T.N.  Srinivasan (1981), 'Credit and  Sharecropping  in
Agrarian  Societies",  Journal  of Development  Economics,  9:289-312.
Braverman,  A and  J.E.  Stiglitz (1986a), "Cost  Sharing  Arrangements  Under
Sharecropping: Moral  Hazard, Incentive Flexibiiity  and Risk",
American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics,  68:642-652.
c_______  (1986b), 'Landlords,  Tenants,  and  Technological Innovations',
Journal  of Development  Economics,  23:313-332.
Dasgupta,  P and  D. Ray (1986),  "Inequality  as  a Determinant  of Malnutrition
and  Unemployment:  Theory",  Economic  Journal,  96:1011-1034.
Greenwald,  B and  J.E.  Stiglitz (1986), 'Externalities  in  Economies  with
Imperfect  Information  and  Incomplete  Markets",  Quarterly  Journal
of  Economics,  101:229-264.
Greenwald, B.,  J.E.  Stiglitz  and  A.  Weiss  (1984). 'Informational
Imperfections  and  Macroeconomic  Fluctuations".  American  Economic
Review,  74:194-199.
Stiglitz,  J.E.  (1974), 'Incentives  and  Risk  Sharing  in  Sharecropping',
Review  of  Economic  Studies,  41:219-255.
Stiglitz,  J.E.  and  A.  Weiss  (1981), 'Credit Rationing in  Markets  (fith
Imperfect  Information',  American  Economic  Review,  71:393-410.PiPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS155 Measuring  Adult  Mortality  in
Developing  Countries:  A Review  and
Assessment  of  Methods  Ian  Timaeus  April  1989  S.  Ainsworth
Wendy  Graham  31091
WPS156 Credit  Cooperatives  in  Israeli
Agriculture  Yoav  KisLev  March  1989  C. Spooner
Zvi  Lerman  37570
Pinhas  Zusman
WPS157 A  Policy  Model  for  Tunisia  with
Real  and  Financial  Flows  Martha  de  Melo  January  1989  A.  Bhai;a
Marc  Leduc  60359
Setareh  Razmara
WPS158 Labor  Redundancy  In  the  Transport
Sector  Alice  Galenson  February  1989  W. Wright
33744
WPS159 Current  International  Gas  Trades
and  Prices  Kay  McKeough  March  1989  M. Fernandez
33637
WPS160 Evaluating  the  Performance  of Public
Enterprises  in  Pakistan  Mary  M. Shirley  March  1989  R.  Malcolm
61708
WPS161 Commodity-Indexed  Debt  In
International  Lending  Timothy  Besley  March  1989  J.  Raulin
Andrew  Powell  33715
WPS162 Ups and  Downs  In Inflation:  Argentina
Since  the  Austral  Plan  Miguel  A.  Kiguel
WPS163 The Impact  of Infrastructure  and
Financial  Institutions  on  Agricultural
Output  and Investment  In  India  Hans  P. Binswanger  March  1989  J.  Arevalo
Shahidur  R.  Khandker  30745
Mark  R. Rosenzweig
WPS164  Intersectoral  Financial  Flows  in
Developing  Countries  Patrick  Honohan  March  1989  W. Pitayatonakarn
Izak  Atlyas  60353
WPS165 Developing  Countries'  Exports  of
Manufactures:  Past  and  Future
Implications  of Shifting  Patterns
of Comparative  Advantage  Alexander  J.  YeatsPPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS166 Achieving  and  Sustaining  Universal
Primary  Education: International
Experience  Relevant  to India  Nat J.  Colletta  March  1989  M. Phillph
Margaret  Sutton  75366
WPS167 Wage  Determination  In  Rural
Bangladesh:  The  Welfare  Implications  Martin  Ravallion
WPS168 Technological  Change  from  Inside:
A  Review  of Breakthroughsl  Ashoka  Mody  March  1989  W. Young
33618
WPS169 Financial  Sector  Reforms  In
Adjustment  Programs  Alan  Gelb
Patrick  Honohan
WPS170 General  Training  Under  Asymmetric
Information  Ellakim  Katz  April  1989  C.  Cristobal
Adrian  Ziderman  33640
WPS171 Cost-Effectiveness  of  National
Training  Syslems  in  Developing
Countries  Christopher  Dougherty  March  1989  C. Cristobal
33643
WPS172 The  Effects  of  Peru's  Push  to
Improve  Education  Elizabeth  M. King  March  1989  C. Cristobal
Rosemary  T.  Bellew  33640
WPS173 Staffing  and  Training  Aspects  of
Hospital  Management:  Some Issues
for  Research  Julio  Frenk
Enrique  Ruelas
WPS174 Trade  Restrictions  with  Imported
Intermediate  Inputs:  When  Does
the  Trade  Balance  Improve?  Ramon  E. Lopez  March  1989  M. Ameal
Dani  Rodrik  61466
WPS175 An Integrated  Model  of Perennial
and  Annual  Crop  Production  for
Sub-Saharan  Countries  Robert  D.  Weaver  May 1989  A.  Daruwala
33716
WPS176 Credit  Rationing,  Tenancy,
Productivity,  and  the  Dynamics
of Inequality  Avishay  Braverman  May 1989  C.  Spooner
Joseph  E.  Stiglitz  37570